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The historian's basic questions, whether he is a historian 
of mathematics or of political institutions, are: what was the 
past like? and how did the present come to be? The second 
question--how did the present come to be?--is the central one in 
the history of mathematics, whether done by historian or mathe- 
matician. But the historian's view of both past and present is 
quite different from that of the mathematician. The historian 
is interested in the past in its full richness, and sees any 
present fact as conditioned by a complex chain of causes in an 
almost unlimited past. The mathematician instead is oriented 
toward the present, and toward past mathematics chiefly insofar 
as it led to important present mathematics. [a] 
I 
What questions do mathematicians generally ask about the 
history of mathematics? When was this concept first defined, 
and what problems led to its definition?" "Who first proved 
this theorem, and how did he do it?" "IS the proof correct by 
modern standards?" The mathematician begins with mathematics 
that is important now, and looks backwards for its antecedents. 
To a mathematician, all mathematics is contemporary; as Little- 
wood put it [A7, p. 813, the ancient Greeks were "Fellows of 
another College." True and significant mathematics is true 
and significant, whenever it may have been done. 
The history of mathematics as written by mathematicians 
tends to be technical, to focus on the content of specific 
papers. It is written on a high mathematical level, and deals 
with significant mathematics. The title of E. T. Bell's The 
Development of Mathematics reflects the mathematician's view. 
The mathematician looks at the development of mathematics, as 
the result of a chronologically and logically connected series 
of papers; he does not look at it as the work of people living 
in considerably different historical settings. 
II 
How is the historian different? First, it goes without 
saying that, in asking what the past was like, the historian 
will be more concerned than the mathematician about the non- 
mathematical, as well as the mathematical past. More sur- 
prising is that even when dealing with strictly technical ques- 
tions, the historian may view things differently from the 
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mathematician. 
While the mathematician sees the past as part of the pres- 
ent, the historian sees the present as laden with archaeological 
relics from the past; he sees everything in the present as hav- 
ing many and diverse roots in the past, and as the end of long, 
complex processes. Many things we take for granted are neither 
logical nor natural. They might even appear arbitrary, but they 
are, instead, the products of particular historical situations. 
For example, the use of the letter “epsilon,” as in delta- 
epsilon proofs, appears arbitrary, but it in fact records the 
origin of the use of inequalities in proofs in analysis. The 
origin was in the study of approximations, the notation Ire silon” 
is Cauchy’s, and the letter seems to stand for “error.” d 
Historians love this sort of explanation, and constantly search 
for ones like it. To take another kind of example, isn’t it 
amazing that the standard 
7 
roof that /2 is irrational is over 
two thousand years old? [c 
Another essential difference between the historian and the 
mathematician is this: the historian of mathematics will ask 
himself what the total mathematical past in some particular 
time-period was like. He will steep himself in many aspects of 
that mathematical past, not just those which have an obvious 
bearing on the antecedents of the particular mathematical de- 
velopment whose history he is tracing. [A2;A3;A4;A8] Let us see 
how this feature of the historian’s approach can be of value to 
the mathematician interested in the history of mathematics. 
Obviously it is easier to find the antecedents of present ideas 
when one knows where to look. The better one knows the past, 
the wider the variety of places he can investigate. In addition, 
through familiarity with specific types of sources, the historian 
knows where to find the answers to particular types of questions. 
By contrast, someone relatively unfamiliar with the time period 
in question will not always understand what past mathematicians 
were trying to do, and will find that the terms used then did 
not always mean what they mean today. [d] 
Let me give some examples to clarify this general point. 
There is a widespread impression that eighteenth-century 
mathematicians were very cavalier in their treatment of con- 
vergence, and it is sometimes 
% 
en said that they assumed that 
once they had shown that the n term of a series went to zero, 
the series converged. Did eighteenth-century mathematicians 
in fact make this error? Hadn’t they ever heard of the harmonic 
series? My own sense of eighteenth-century mathematics says 
that eighteenth-century mathematicians weren’t that incompetent. 
They knew the divergence of the harmonic series [e]. People 
like Euler, D’Alembert, Lagrange, and Laplace were not hopelessly 
confused. In fact, D’Alembert and Lagrange investigated the 
remainders of specific infinite series and tried to find bounds 
on the value of those remainders [fl. Why, then, did even these 
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men sometimes say “the series converges” when they had shown 
only that the nth term goes to zero? Because, in the eighteenth 
century, the term “converge” was used in different ways; some- 
times, it was used as we use it; often, however, it was used to 
say that the nth term went to zero or that the terms of the series 
got smaller [g]. This conclusion, which I reached after read- 
ing numerous eighteenth-century papers, can be reliably verified 
by looking at the Diderot-D’Alembert i?ncyclop&ie [h]. The 
modern definition of convergent series -- that the partial sums 
of the series have a limit -- was established by Cauchy [B6 (2), 
vol. 3, p. 1141. It is hard to avoid reading this modern mean- 
ing back into eighteenth-century mathematics. But this linguis- 
tic point, once understood, makes sense out of much eighteenth- 
century work on infinite series. 
Another advantage of knowing the mathematical past is that 
the historian can construct a total picture of the background of 
some specific modern achievement. Rather than just looking at 
the major papers on the same topic, he may find the antecedents 
of some modern theories in unlikely places. A well-known ex- 
ample is the way the general definition of function came, not 
merely out of attempts to describe the class of all known al- 
gebraic expressions, but, more importantly, from the attempts 
to characterize the solutions to the partial differential 
equation for the vibrating string [i]. Another example may be 
found in the way Thomas Hawkins in his Lebesgue's theory of 
Integration [El43 has presented the full nineteenth-century 
background, drawing on a wide variety of mathematical work be- 
sides earlier ideas on integration. 
For another example, consider Cauchy’s definition of the 
derivative and the proofs of theorems based on that definition. 
In looking at the introductory sections of eighteenth-century 
calculus books, one finds a long string of definitions of de- 
rivatives, and debates about their nature -- debates stemming 
from the attack on the foundations of the calculus by Bishop 
Berkeley. One might well view each of these old definitions 
and polemics as major contributors to Cauchy’s final formulation. 
However, what was more important than the explicit verbal def- 
inition Cauchy gave for the derivative are the associated in- 
equality proof-techniques he pioneered. And these techniques 
came from elsewhere. The basic inequality property Cauchy used 
to define the derivative came to him from Lagrange’s work on 
the Lagrange remainder in the latter’s lectures on the calculus 
at the Ecole polytechnique [j]. The inequality proof-techniques 
themselves were developed largely in the study of algebraic 
approximations in the eighteenth century [k]. 
Let us now take up a characteristic of the historian which 
we have not yet considered. We expect the historian to know the 
general history of a particular time as well as the mathematics 
of that time. He should have a sense of what it was like to be 
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a person, not just a mathematician, at that time. Sometimes 
such knowledge has great explanatory value. One would not want 
to treat the history of the foundations of the calculus with- 
out knowing about the attacks on the calculus by the theologian 
Berkeley [B3, ch. VI]; or the flowering of seventeenth-and 
eighteenth-century mathematics without reference to the con- 
temporary explosion in the natural sciences, especially Newton- 
ian physics [A6]. One cannot treat the growth of the French 
school of mathematics in the nineteenth century without men- 
tioning a major cause -- the founding by the French revolution- 
ary government of the Ecole polytechnique, providing employ- 
ment and a first-rate mathematical community for its facult 
and an excellent mathematical education for its students [l 5 
, 
. 
One would not want to explain the relative absence of women in 
the ranks of nineteenth-century mathematicians without refer- 
ring to the lack of access to higher education for women in 
Europe at a time when mathematics was so s 
P 
ecialized and ad- 
vanced that formal training was essential m]. 
By virtue of his training, the historian has been exposed 
to a number of general historiographical questions and is used 
to hearing them asked. For instance, there are theories of the 
nature of scientific change, like Thomas Kuhn's theory of scien- 
tific revolutions [A3]. Again, there are sociologically based 
theories like Robert Merton's analysis of priority controversies 
in science [A13]. The historian of mathematics,without having 
to become a disciple of Kuhn or Merton, can use such theories 
to help ask fruitful questions about the past of mathematics, 
and about the time period in which the mathematics occurred. 
He has the questions already at hand, and need not figure them 
out from first principles. 
III 
Our description of the possible contributions of historians 
and mathematicians to the writing of the history of mathematics 
has required, as well, some description of what the history of 
mathematics is like. Let us know turn to a different, but re- 
lated question. What value has the history of mathematics, 
whether done by historian or mathematician? Of course, there is 
an inherent fascination in any history,and work in the history 
of mathematics certainly should be an element in the history of 
human culture in general. But another essential use exists -- 
for the mathematician -- in teaching and understanding mathematics. 
Historical background can help teach mathematics in three 
ways. First, the history can help the teacher understand the in- 
herent difficulty of certain concepts. A concept which took 
hundreds of years to develop is probably hard, and the historical 
difficulties may well resemble student difficulties. 
Second, understanding how a mathematical idea arose can help 
motivate students. It helps answer questions like, "Why might 
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somebody want to think about it in this particular way?” [n]. 
Isolated historical comments, of course, do not make history. 
What one would like to do for one’s students -- and for that 
matter, for oneself -- is to give them a sense of how the whole 
sub j ect developed, and how the whole background of the subject 
fits together. Such a sense would motivate not just one con- 
cept or proof, but the entire subject. 
Third, the historical background can help the student -- 
or the mathematician -- see how mathematics fits in with the 
rest of human thought; how Descartes the mathematician relates 
to Descartes the philosopher; how the rise of German mathematics 
in the mid-nineteenth century fits into the rise of German 
science, technology, and national power at that time. To see 
past mathematics in its historical context helps to see pre- 
sent mathematics in its philosophical, scientific, and social 
context, and to have a better understanding of the place of 
mathematics in the world. 
IV 
If the history of mathematics is indeed to be used in these 
ways, we need more of it. There now exists a technical lit- 
erature which has established what the important results and 
their major antecedents are in many areas [o]. There is a need 
now for more studies on the full historical background of many 
subjects in modern mathematics -- the theory of functions of a 
complex variable, for instance, or the rise of abstract algebra, 
or the philosophical and mathematical impact of non-Euclidean 
geometry. And the existing work needs to be made more available 
through the offering of full-scale courses in the history of 
mathematics , placingthemonographsof BoyerandHawkinsalong with 
the general histories of mathematics on the library shelves, 
and ordering Archive for the History of the Exact Sciences and 
iiistoria Mathematics for the departmental library along with the 
Bulletin and the Monthly. Finally, there are now too few his- 
torians of mathematics. The path for the historian of mathematics 
is difficult; he needs the historian’s training, but also needs 
to know a great deal of mathematics. The history of science is 
itself a young and relatively small profession; the number of 
historians of mathematics, because of the types of knowledge 
needed, is even smaller. Still the need for such people is ap- 
parent. 
Even if historians of mathematics were legion, however, the 
contribution of mathematicians to the history of mathematics 
would remain crucial. Mathematicians, of course, bring a higher 
level of mathematical knowledge to any historical task. His- 
torians of mathematics should certainly know the mathematics 
whose history they are writing. But mathematicians are still 
needed -- and not just because they know the mathematics better. 
Historians need the mathematician’s point of view about what is 
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mathematically important. The mathematician’s work determines 
what it is that most needs a historical explanation. Only the 
mathematician can tell us which of a half-dozen contemporary 
concepts is really the crucial one, and which older concepts 
are worth looking into again -- infinitesimals are one example 
(See Abraham Robinson’s Non-Standard Analysis [C29], esp. ch. 
10) t Furthermore, the mathematician has a better idea of the 
logical relationship between mathematical ideas, and can suggest 
connections to the historian which might not be apparent from 
the historical record alone. 
We have seen that the mathematician and the historian bring 
different skills and different perspectives to their common task 
of explaining the mathematical present by means of the past. 
Therefore, as this conference by its existence declares, col- 
laboration between mathematicians and historians can be fruit- 
ful. The value of such a collaboration will be enhanced if each 
collaborator understands the unique contributions which can be 
made by the other, The importance of the common task, I think, 
makes it well work the collective efforts. 
NOTES 
a. By “historian” and “mathematician” I do not mean a 
classification according to the field of a person’s Ph.D., but 
according to his general point of view. For our present pur- 
pose, Dirk Struik and Thomas Hawkins are historians; E. T. Bell 
and the authors of the Encyclopsdie der mathematischen Wissen- 
schaften [13] are mathematicians. In general mathematicians 
and historians have, while writing the history of mathematics, 
in fact taken the different approaches I describe, though there 
is no a priori reason they would necessarily have to do so. 
b. In an approximation to the sum of an infinite series, 
an 18th century mathematician might take n terms and ask how 
large the “error” -- the difference between the nth partial sum 
and the sum of the infinite series -- might be. The series con- 
verges in Cauchy’s sense when the difference can be made less 
than any assignable error. Compare his Cours d'analyse [B6(2), 
vol. 31 with his article in- the Comptes Rendus 37 (1853) [B6 
(l), vol. 12, pp. 114-1241’. 
C. See Van der Waerden’s Science Awakening [9, p. 1101 
and compare Aristotle’s Prior Analytics i 23, 41a, 26-27. 
d. In my article [A5] in the Am. Math. Mon. 81, 354-365, 
I have treated this point at length, especially with respect 
to changing standards of proof in analysis. 
e. The divergence of the harmonic series was proved in 
the late 17th century by Johann and Jakob Bernoulli, and, for 
that matter, was shown in the 14th century by Nicole Oresme. 
For Oresme, see [3, p. 2931; for the Bernoullis, [16, pp. 320-241 
f. See J. d’Alembert, “RCflexions sur les suites et sur les 
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racines imaginaires, " Opuscules Math&natiques, 1768, vol. 5, 
pp. 171-83, esp. p. 173. See also Lagrange, Thikrie des 
Fonctions Analytiques, 2nd ed., 1813 in [B24, vol. IX,pp. 83-841. 
g. For examples of this usage, see d’Alembert, op. cit.; L. 
Euler, “De seriebus divergentibus” in [Bll (l), vol. 15, pp. 586, 
5881; and Lagrange, “Sur la rCsolution des equations numeriques,” 
1772 [B24, II, p. 5411. 
h. See also d’Alembert, Dictionnaire raisonng des math&a- 
tiques, which collects the mathematical articles from the Ency- 
clop&die, articles “Convergence” and “Seri& ou suite.” Compare 
G. S. Kluegel, Mathematisches Woerterbuch, 1803, article 
“Convergirend, Annaehernd . fr 
i. See [B23]; compare [16, pp. 351-681; and C. Truesdell, 
“The rational mechanics of flexible or elastic bodies, 1638- 
1788” in [Bll (2), 11, Sect. 2 (1960)]. 
See [AS pp. 361-631 and Leqons sur le calcul des fonc- 
tioni*(2nd. ed. 1806) in [B24], vol. X, p. 871. 
k. See Lagrange, Trait6 de la rkolution des squations 
numkiques de tous les degrk, 2nd ed., 1808, in [B24, vol. VIII, 
pp. 46-7, 1631. Compare d’Alembert, opuscules mathgmatiques, 
1768, vol. 5, pp. 171-83. 
1. J. T. Merz, History of European Thought in the Nine- 
teenth Century, vol. I (1904), Dover reprint, 1965. 
m. See [B29]; L. Osen, women in Mathematics, M.1 .T. Press, 
1974; J. L. Coolidge, “Six female mathematicians,” Scripta 
Math. 7 (1951), pp. 20-31. 
n. A view championed by Lebesgue. See May’s biography in 
H. Lebesgue, Measure and the Integral [B27, p. 51. 
0. A good introduction to the literature up to 1936, with 
extensive and humane annotations, is Sarton’s Study of the His- 
tory of Mathematics [7]. For a detailed, up-to-date, and 
extremely valuable guide see May’s Bibliography [6]. 
DISCUSSION 
The discussion began with three comments by Dieudonn6. 
First, he raised a technical point regarding convergence in the 
eighteenth century. He claimed that there are many examples to 
be found among the works of eighteenth-century mathematicians 
where divergent series are given a sum. Secondly, Dieudonn6 
commented regarding the relationship between mathematics and fac- 
tors external to its development. He stated that, for example, 
the general history of the seventeenth century had no connection 
with Fermat’s theory of numbers. Further, in spite of the fact 
that Descartes, Leibniz, and Cantor were all philosophers and 
mathematicians, mathematicians in general are not philosophers; 
they do mathematics. And thirdly, Dieudonng asserted that simply 
because the choice of notation may be motivated by circumstances 
external to mathematical reasoning, does not, however, make this 
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fact significant. He firmly held that such motivating circum- 
stances have no significance. 
In her response to Dieudonne’s first point, Grabiner 
emphazized her basic agreement with Dieudonne. Of course it is 
true, she agreed, that mathematicians in the eighteenth century 
used divergent series; she had not intended to dispute that fact 
(See for instance “De seriebus divergentibus” in [Bll (1)vol. 15, 
PP. 586-588). She re-emphasized her claim that some (and not 
all) historical discussions of infinite series can be illuminated 
by considering the two definitions of convergence used in the 
eighteenth century. 
Kahane emphasized the difference between definitions of 
convergence and proofs of convergence. He claimed that already 
in 1807, Fourier had in mind a definition of convergence based 
on partial sums, i.e., before Cauchy. [This definition is to 
be found in Fourier’s basic paper on heat conduction submitted 
to the Academy of Sciences of Paris in 1807. The manuscript is 
in the library of the Ecole des Ponts etchausseesand was later 
published in 1822 as part of his Thgorie analytique de la chaleur 
-- Ed.]. It would have been possible, stated Kahane, for Fourier 
to give proof of convergence, but he did not do so. Actually, 
when Cauchy attempted to prove the convergence of Fourier series, 
he committed several notable errors, one of which was to mistake 
absolute convergence for conditional convergence. Ironically, 
this proved to be helpful, by providing a motivation for Dir- 
ichlet to press on, concluded Kahane. 
In regard to Dieudonne’s second comment, Edwards began 
by pointing out that precisely in Fermat’s time, the redis- 
covery and translation of the texts of Diophantus occurred. He 
believed that the events in the general cultural history of the 
era were extremely relevant to the development of the theory 
of numbers by Fermat. Hawkins further noted that at least in 
the past many mathematicians were interested in philosophy. 
Dou continued in this vein. To him, mathematics is be- 
coming separated from the world, and this is dangerous for 
mathematics, Even with the Greeks, Dou claimed, mathematics 
was a real part of life, something to live with. In recent times, 
there has been a move to separate mathematics and philosophy, 
and consequently there has arisen a severe need to bridge the 
gap between the two. Whereas the choice of notation may be ir- 
relevant to mathematics, its philosophy is not. 
Putnam concluded this line of thought by noting that the 
philosophy of mathematics from Plato on has always been of great 
importance not only for mathematics, but for epistemology and 
metaphysics as well. Mackey concluded the discussion with a com- 
ment on the pedagogical value of the history and philosophy of 
mathematics to students of mathematics. In Mackey’s opinion, 
both of these approaches to mathematics can be illuminating, but 
one must question the level of accuracy required. Neither the 
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historian’s nor the philosopher’s detailed accuracy is bene- 
ficial pedagogically. Mackey expressed interest in history, 
but felt that because of the pressures of his discipline, he 
could not be interested in too detailed a history. 
